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Abstract
In 2005 the European Union (EU) began the first phase of the largest and most ambitious
emissions trading system (EU ETS) ever attempted, which then applied to all members of the
EU. In its second phase which began in 2008 the EU ETS now applies to all 27 members of
the EU together with Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein, the members of the European
Economic Area (EEA) which are not members of the Union. In the first phase of the EU ETS
permits to emit carbon into the atmosphere known as European Union Allowances (EUA)
were traded in a market where the price rose to €30 and eventually fell to well below 10 Euro
cents as the imperfections of the market became obvious. In the second phase which began in
2008 the price has fluctuated between €30 and €8. EUA are traded in a manner which is
similar to the trading of financial instruments and a range of derivatives has developed with
the total value of the market now above €120b, a growing market dominated by a few large
players.
This paper reports some results of an empirical investigation into the factors which
appear to drive the carbon price and the key determinants of the price of an EUA. Over the
last decade a number of environmental products have been developed alongside the EUA,
including Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs), Renewable Energy Certificates and White
Certificates (energy efficiency credits) and markets have developed for a range of these
environmental products. A better understanding of the determinants of these markets will
help regulators manage these new markets and this paper aims to enhance our knowledge of
the market.
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Introduction
There is a clear move around the world to develop emissions trading schemes (ETS). The EU
scheme is probably the best known, but now New Zealand has one, Japan has tabled the
outline of one and many US states and Canadian provinces have moved to develop one. The
North Eastern regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the USA is now in operation and
it applies to emissions in ten US states. The Western Climate Initiative (WCI) has established
a trading mechanism that could apply to eight Western states and four Canadian provinces.
Political changes have limited the introduction of this scheme but it has become the basis of a
scheme which will start in California next year. Also there are a number of other initiatives in
the USA which may lead to an ETS, including the Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction
Accord (which applies in six US states and one Canadian province) and the Energy Security
and Climate Change Stewardship Platform for the Midwest (eleven US states and one
Canadian province).
Market-based solutions to solving the global warming problem are increasing around
the world as it is believed that an ETS in the form of a cap-and-trade system will facilitate the
abatement of greenhouse gas pollution at the lowest possible cost to the community. This
may be true if it is properly established and monitored, as there are likely to be many
problems in establishing a top-down market for an artificial scarcity (emissions permits)
created by government. A different market-based approach that exists in many countries is to
impose a carbon tax on polluters as there is plenty of evidence that directly increasing the
price of a pollutant through a tax has the effect of reducing demand, this approach has been
used in many places to discourage the use of plastic bags and bottles.
Trading of emissions permits has begun and yet there is no definitive accounting
standard which explains the nature of a permit and how it should be treated in the balance
sheets of companies, though the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued a
draft standard (IFRIC 3 Emission Rights) in December 2004 and withdrew the draft in June
2005. It appears that emissions permits are being traded in a way that is similar to financial
instruments though they do not appear to have the characteristics of financial instruments and
a range of derivative instruments have been developed for trading.
This paper reports some research which has attempted to assess the main drivers of
the price of an emissions permit. Obviously demand and supply factors determine price in the
short-run but this paper is concerned with the factors which may influence price in the
medium term as some understanding of this is essential for a rational trade in derivatives.
Currently the markets offer futures which guarantee the delivery of numbers of permits at
various times in the future, and the valuation model used for these futures is not clear at the
moment. The purpose of the futures is also in question as they may be used for hedging
against future price rises or as speculative instruments by buyers and sellers and the valuation
model can be expected to vary in each case.
The paper proceeds with a discussion of the theory which informs the establishment
of emissions trading markets. The third section provides a summary of some relevant
literature, results are presented in the fourth section, followed by a conclusion in the final
section.
Theory
For the purpose of this paper, theory mainly comes from two broad areas: economic theory
and finance theory. While economic theory essentially involves the theory of perfect
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competition; finance theory is principally concerned with the concept of the Efficient-Market
Hypothesis (EMH).
Theory of Perfect Competition and the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH)
An invisible hand, the term initiated by Adam Smith, suggests that free interaction of players
in a market economy leads to a desirable social outcome (Joyce 2001). As further stated by
Joyce (2001), an invisible hand process is one in which the market operates in a decentralised
way, with no overt agreements between the market players. Essentially, the system should
function even without the players having any knowledge of the market and this is why the
process is called invisible (Joyce 2001). According to Taylor and Frost (2009), the model that
is used most often to show how markets work is called perfect competition. Amongst some of
the key assumptions of a perfectly competitive market are the existence of a large number of
buyers and sellers, and the homogeneity of the goods traded. In addition, buyers and sellers
also need complete information and businesses must be completely free to enter or exit the
market without transaction costs. This model is fundamentally related to the supply and
demand model, and presumes utility maximisation for buyers and profit maximisation for
sellers (Taylor & Frost 2009).
Nevertheless, most markets do not encompass all the characteristics of perfect
competition. Instead, imperfect competition tends to describe most markets. Under imperfect
competition the number of sellers is small, or the goods traded differ somewhat from each
other, or consumers and producers are not able to acquire comprehensive information about
prices, or transaction costs are high. This seems to be exactly the case with the carbon market
where we have a limited number of both buyers and sellers, where there are several
exchanges and only one commodity is traded [being the carbon permit] and where both
parties to the transaction are unable to obtain adequate information about prices and the
underlying value of carbon permits. However, the model of perfect competition enables one
to take a broad view of how markets operate and whether they operate efficiently and it
makes it possible for one to comprehend what happens when markets fail (Taylor & Frost
2009).
A major forecast of the perfect competition model is that a price will be the end result
of the interaction amongst market players so that the quantity supplied is equivalent to the
quantity demanded, known as the equilibrium price (Taylor & Frost 2009). The perfect
competition model, which incorporates the behaviour of buyers and sellers, aims to explain
the price, the quantity consumed by each buyer and the quantity produced by each seller. It
also explains the marginal benefit of consumption for each buyer and marginal cost for each
seller.
Even though the idea of upward and downward price movements to achieve
equilibrium between the quantity supplied and the quantity demanded makes some sense, it is
not a precise depiction of what happens in the real world market. In most markets, no one is
capable of even observing the supply and demand curves. The legitimacy of the model
depends upon its performance in explaining or forecasting prices and quantities in markets
where market participants conduct various transactions through buying and selling products
and services (Taylor & Frost 2009). In conclusion, the discussion presented above highlights
the role of theory of perfect competition as an analytical tool used to describe the principles
of market mechanism.
The EMH is closely related to the theory of perfect competition but focused on the
informational efficiency of markets, as it is generally accepted in finance that healthy
competition amongst investors will tend to create an efficient market, in which prices will
promptly reflect any new information in an unbiased manner, thus making it difficult to yield
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constantly superior returns (Brealey, Myers & Allen 2006; Viney 2007). The weak form of
the efficient–market hypothesis occurs when prices efficiently impound all the information in
the past series of stock prices, which makes it impossible for market participants to make
superior returns simply by following patterns in stock prices (Brealey et al. 2006; Viney
2007). The semi-strong form of the efficient–market hypothesis suggests that prices are
inclusive of all publicly available information, while the strong form of the efficient–market
hypothesis requires that stock prices reflect all available information, including data from
private sources (Brealey et al. 2006; Viney 2007). The EMH stresses the informational
efficiency of a market as opposed to the allocative efficiency and many markets have been
found to possess weak-form informational efficiency. It remains an open question whether
the European carbon markets are informationally efficient as three studies published so far
present an ambiguous picture, though all agree that markets were not efficient in the first
phase of the EU ETS (Daskalakis & Markellos 2008; Montagnoli & de Vries 2010; Seifert
Uhrig-Homburg & Wagner 2008).
Relevant Literature
The literature review for this paper revolves around the three key areas of the influence of
regulatory processes and government intervention on the design and settings of the scheme,
carbon price volatility, and the factors that affect the price of carbon.
Influence of Regulatory Processes and Government Intervention on the Design and Settings of the
Scheme
Legislation is aimed at directly changing the behaviour of polluters by outlawing or limiting
certain practices (Beder 2006). As identified by MacKenzie (2008), the primary role of the
government under emissions trading is setting a cap on emissions. According to Retamal
(2009, p.6), “carbon credits are a new type of immaterial commodity, highly dependent on
political decisions”. In fact, as outlined by the European Climate Exchange (2004), the EU
emissions trading market has been operating in an environment dominated by political and
regulatory influence. The European Climate Exchange (2004) and Agritrade (2004) proposed
that policy and regulatory issues are amongst the key drivers that are likely to have an impact
on the design and settings of the carbon market.
The study by Bettelheim and Janetos (2008, p.1) found that the “structural flaws in the
EU ETS are quickly reflected in exchange traded prices”. Clearly, the disclosure that the
European Commission had allocated too many carbon permits in Phase One of the European
carbon trading scheme was followed by an immediate collapse of EUA prices in April, 2006
(Bettelheim & Janetos 2008; Kirat & Ahamada 2009). This sudden collapse of the carbon
price followed the disclosure of the 2005 verified emissions by the European authorities
(Kirat & Ahamada 2009). The results revealed a net long position of the carbon market with
more allowances than actual emissions (Kirat & Ahamada 2009). Similarly, the recent
announcement by the European Commission of its intention to curtail use of CERs in Phase
Three (beginning in 2012) had an almost immediate depressive effect on both carbon prices
and exchange activity. This is clearly a manifestation of poor market regulation (Bettelheim
& Janetos 2008). A further issue highlighted by the authors is, is that the uncertainty created
by repeated political and regulatory interference is a key problem for markets (Bettelheim &
Janetos 2008). Under the EU ETS, this interference is further facilitated by dividing the
scheme compliance into phases, which is undoubtedly in conflict with the need for long-term
investment, perhaps measured in decades, aimed at overcoming global climate change
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(Bettelheim & Janetos 2008). Evidence from phase one and phase two so far suggests that
such an environment prevents carbon markets from functioning efficiently.
Carbon Price Volatility
According to Poon (2005), volatility refers to the “spread of all likely outcomes of an
uncertain variable”, in this case, price (2005, p.1). In theory, the price of permits under the
EU ETS should establish the marginal cost of emissions reductions sufficient to meet the cap
set in the scheme (Betz, 2006). The reality, however, appears somewhat different, resulting in
substantial volatility.
Kruger (2008) looked into some of the general factors that contribute to price
volatility and argued that price volatility under the EU ETS was mainly caused by fuel prices,
weather and policy developments. Importantly, the latter reasoning carries considerable
implications for one of the research questions addressed here, which seeks to identify the
influence of regulatory processes and government intervention on carbon price
discoverability.
In assessing price volatility of the carbon market, Betz (2006) found that the main
reason underlying the volatility is the fact that the EU ETS is a relatively new market and
new markets generally require time to realise real price discovery. It is unlikely that a market
structured like the EU ETS, with a small number of large players being dominant, can easily
achieve informational efficiency. There are three recent studies which shed some light on this
issue with Seifert et al (2008) suggesting some evidence of efficiency based upon a test of
autocorrelations, but only using a very small sample. In sharp contrast to this Daskalis and
Markellos (2008) found significant autocorrelations in the data and dismissed the random
walk notion as applying to carbon prices. The more recent study by Montagnoli and de Vries
(2010) used a series of variance ratio tests to find that:
“For the sample periods 27 June 2005 to 28 December 2007 (Phase I) and 26 February 2008 to 4 April
2009 (Phase II) the EMH is tested through variance-ratio tests while adjusting for thin trading. The
results show that the EU ETS was inefficient during Phase I but efficient during the first period of Phase
II. This suggests that the carbon market shows the first signs of maturation after the learning and trial
period of Phase I (Montagnoli & de Vries, p.6).”

However, they are aware of the problems created by this trading and advise “some
caution in the interpretation of the results” (p.5). Their published information on trading
volumes certainly raises questions about the study and the use of non-parametric statistics is
an interesting departure from the earlier studies.
Though the carbon market is clearly still at a pilot stage of development, there is
evidence to suggest that the carbon permit market is starting to show some signs of efficiency
as a centre of price discovery and dissemination and that in the near future it is likely to grow
in size and scope of complexity (Bettelheim & Janetos 2010).
Factors that Affect the Price of Carbon
The paper aims to present a picture as to what factors influence the price of permits in the
secondary carbon market. The approach is based on a time series of changes in such external
factors as the level of industrial activity and, thus, the level of CO2 emissions, gas, oil and
coal prices, and weather conditions (indicated by temperature) in the UK, Germany, France
and Italy; as well as conduct a cross-sectional analysis of movements in prices of permits.
Importantly, most of the literature in this field relates to the EU ETS and covers the
factors that have shaped the price of carbon dioxide permits under the European scheme.
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EurActiv (2009), observed the overall trend that caused the slump in the price of the CO2
markets. Official EU data published in May 2006, when the carbon price halved
overnight, showed that a group of countries, including large polluters such as Germany, were
left with 44.1 million tonnes of extra CO2 allowances for year 2005 (EurActiv 2009). Among
the EU's major polluters, only the UK had emitted more than its quota, forcing it to buy over
30 million tonnes of extra allowances in the EU carbon market (EurActiv 2009). Research
undertaken by EurActiv (2009) emphasises that it was the supply surplus that caused carbon
prices to crash, thus calling into question the credibility of the efficiency of the EU scheme
(EurActiv 2009).
Convery and Redmond (2007, p.88) argued that “in the case of climate change and
other environmental challenges, the market will not produce the ‘right’ carbon price”. The
authors refer this to “market failure, which occurs because for exchanges to take place, assets
must be owned, they must be divisible, and appropriate legal and institutional mechanisms
must be in place to enable a price to emerge” (Convery & Redmond 2007, p.88).
Nevertheless, “in regard to climate change, none of these conditions has applied” (Convery &
Redmond 2007, p.88). Clearly, the ability of the atmosphere to absorb anthropogenic
greenhouse gases cannot be owned, neither can it be readily divided and sold. Furthermore,
as pinpointed by Convery and Redmond (2007, p.88), appropriate legal and institutional
frameworks have not existed to enable competent exchange. Thus far, it may be put forward
that “the carbon market has failed to reflect the scarcity value, and global warming pressures
have intensified”.
Point Carbon and Chicago Climate Exchange (2004) along with the European Climate
Exchange (2004) suggested that the price of carbon will depend on a number of factors,
including weather, fuel prices and economic growth, - all of which will be tested here.
Retamal (2009) has also recognised that such factors as fuel prices (coal and gas) and weather
have influenced the price of permits under the EU ETS. In the study on the carbon price
determinants under the EU ETS, Betz (2006) determined that weather has a significant
impact on emissions of the major covered installations since they are in the power and heat
sector. According to Betz (2006), the summer of 2005 was hot and the winter of 2005/06 was
very cold and led to a clear increase in energy requirements. Effectively, weather
(temperatures) can affect the price of carbon due to its impact on the demand for, and supply
of, electricity.
However, an analysis of the carbon market between December 1, 2004 and July 31,
2006 by Redmond and Convery (2006) revealed that movements in energy prices have had
the most significant impact on the development of the price of permits. The two energy
commodities that were analysed by Redmond and Convery (2006) were oil and natural gas.
Increases in the price of oil appeared to have the greatest impact on the price of permits.
Redmond and Convery (2006) believe that the price of oil shows up so strongly because it
reflects the tying of gas contracts to oil prices.
Finally, as the EU member states attempt to meet their own self-interest within the
constraints imposed by the EU ETS, they influence price by shaping the quantity and timing
of allowances coming to market and the incentives that firms face to abate, absorb the costs,
or pass them through to consumers (which feed back to influence the demand for
allowances). The bigger a member state’s share of total allowances, the bigger its influence
on price. Thus, on the basis of the literature reviewed, there is a need for more comprehensive
and ample research into the pricing of permits in the secondary carbon market.
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Empirical Analysis of Price Determinants
In this paper, empirical testing is conducted to determine whether changes in carbon price are
linked to changes in the price of natural gas, oil and coal, as well as the variability of weather
(temperature), fluctuations in the level of GDP and the occurrence of the global financial
crisis (denoted as GFC), using longitudinal time series monthly data for four years from year
2006 to 20092 and covering four European countries, France, Germany, Italy and the UK.
Hence, this paper covers all of the pilot phase of the EU ETS (2005-2007) and a substantial
part of Phase Two (2008-2012) ending in December 2009. Overall, there are 48 observations
for each series of data. Appendix 1 plots movements in the price of carbon permits, natural
gas, oil and coal, as well as fluctuations in temperature and changes in GDP.
The choice of the four European countries, namely France, Germany, Italy and the
UK, is justified by the fact that these countries are the largest European polluters (as per
2007 estimates) and they have the highest GDP in Europe (covering four years from 2005 to
2008). Table 1 below lists CO2 emissions due to human activity for the four countries.
According to the United Nations Statistics Division (2010), as illustrated in Figure 1, in 2007
France, Germany, Italy and the UK were the largest European carbon polluters, with
Germany (787,936 MCO2) being the biggest CO2 emitter, followed by the UK (539,617
MCO2), Italy (456,428 MCO2) and France (371,757 MCO2), respectively. Together, the four
countries emit 55.03% of Europe’s CO2 emissions and 7.35% of the world total.
Table 1
Countries by CO2 Emissions Due to Human Activity (2007)
Country

Annual CO2 emissions
(in thousands of metric tons)

Percentage of Europe’s
total CO2 emissions

France
Germany
Italy
UK
Total
Europe
World

371,757
787,936
456,428
539,617
2,155,738
3,917,512
29,321,302

9.49%
20.11%
11.65%
13.77%
55.03%
100%
n/a

Percentage of the world
total CO2 emissions
1.27%
2.69%
1.56%
1.84%
7.35%
13.36%
100%

Source: United Nations Statistics Division (2010)

Besides being Europe’s four largest emitters, France, Germany, Italy, and the UK also had
the highest GDP (current $US)3 during the time frame covering 2005-2008, with Germany
having the greatest GDP, followed by the UK, France and Italy, accordingly. Together, the
four countries contribute around 60% to the EU aggregate GDP. Figure 1 further illustrates
the individual contribution of each of the four countries to Europe’s overall GDP between
2005 and 2008.

2

The EU ETS officially commenced in January 2005. However, because no trading occurred on ECX prior to 9
January 2006, the time series for all variables begins from the latter date and covers a four-year period until 31
December 2009.
3
GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. Data are in current US dollars;
i.e. dollar figures for GDP, and are converted from domestic currencies using single year official exchange rates.
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Figure 1
Europe’s Four Largest Emitters (2007)

Source: United Nations Statistics Division (2010)

The Price of Carbon
The price of carbon was extracted as a daily price of carbon permits from the European
Climate Exchange (ECX) permit price history database (ECX Emissions Index) and
converted into monthly estimates for the period from January 2006 until December 2009. At
present there are several carbon exchanges operating in Europe. For the purpose of our
research, the price of carbon was obtained from the ECX, since it is the largest European
carbon exchange in number of transactions. In fact, the ECX attracts over 80% of the
exchange-traded volume in the European CO2 market, thus making it the leading marketplace
for trading carbon dioxide emissions in Europe (ECX 2010a). Similarly, Mizrach and Otsubo
(2010) name the European Climate Exchange the largest EU ETS trading venue. In fact, “the
ECX captures 2/3 of the screen traded market in EUA and more than 90% in CER” (Mizrach
& Otsubo 2010, p.1). More than 65 leading businesses, including global companies such as
ABN AMRO, Barclays, BP, Calyon, E.ON UK, Fortis, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and
Shell have signed up for membership to trade ECX products (ECX 2010). In addition, several
hundred clients can access the market daily via banks and brokers (ECX 2010).
The Price of Natural Gas
The price of natural gas represents the price of UK Natural Gas (NBPI) and was extracted
from the ICE (Intercontinental Exchange) database. In addition to being a secure source of
energy, the use of natural gas also offers a number of environmental benefits over other
sources of energy, particularly other fossil fuels. In terms of emissions, natural gas is the
cleanest of all the fossil fuels, as evidenced by the Energy Information Administration (EIA
1998) as well as Lustgarten and ProPublica (2008). In fact, the combustion of natural gas
emits almost 25-30% less CO2 than oil, and about 45% less than good quality thermal coal
(Lustgarten & ProPublica 2008; Naturalgas.org 2010). Figure 2 further illustrates the relative
carbon footprint of the three energy sources discussed in the paper. Besides being cleaner,
natural gas is also more abundant: assuming steady levels of production, the world’s supply
of natural gas will last 65 years, and that is higher than oil's 41 years (Wikinvest 2010). As
illustrated in Appendix 1, prior to mid-2008, natural gas prices were skyrocketing. However,
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the financial crisis of 2008, along with a global economic slowdown and excess supply, has
caused demand growth for natural gas to fall into the negatives (Seeking Alpha 2008). “In
December of 2009, the Independent Energy Agency (IEA) stated that by 2030 world natural
gas demand will increase from 3TCM4 in 2007 to 4.3TCM” (Al Fathi 2009), thus signifying a
30% growth rate.
Figure 2
Relative Carbon Footprint of Various Energy Sources

Source: Spaccavento (2009)

Amongst the most potent drivers of natural gas prices are: economic conditions,
weather and seasonal fluctuations, as well as political arrangements. Because of the recent
financial crisis, natural gas demand had started to fall since the summer of 2008 (Seeking
Alpha 2008). Concerning weather and seasonal fluctuations, natural gas demand observably
fluctuates on a cyclical basis, falling in summer months and rising in winter months (Money
2008). The need for heat during winter compared to summer is the primary factor responsible
for these fluctuations (Money 2008). Seasonal anomalies, like cooler summers or warmer
winters, can dampen this effect and change the amount of gas demanded on a large scale,
thereby affecting natural gas prices (Wikinvest 2010). Utilities that purchase gas when prices
are lower during the summer months in order to keep inventories ready for the winter have a
muting effect on natural gas seasonality (Long 2005).
The Price of Oil
The price of oil is the average of UK Brent, Dubai and West Texas Intermediate and was
sourced from the IMF database. The majority of scientists tend to agree that there will be no
oil commercially available by 2030, and no oil reserves left at all by 2040, unless adequate
alternatives are discovered. There are also theories that the peak of the global oil production
may occur in the next 2–3 years. From 2005 to 2008 world crude oil production decreased by
3% (Energy Information Administration [EIA] 2009). According to peak oil theory,
4

TCM stands for trillion cubic meters
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increasing production will lead to a more rapid collapse of production in the future, while
decreasing production will lead to a slower decrease. In a stated goal of increasing oil prices
to $75, which had fallen from a high of $147 to a low of $40, OPEC announced decreasing
production by 2.2 million barrels per day beginning January 2009 (BBC News 2008), This
indicates a clear intention to influence oil prices by OPEC and casts doubt on the randomness
of movements in oil prices. According to the data provided by IMF (2010), this would very
well explain an immense increase in the price of oil starting from January 2009. Peak oil
research shows that about half of the available petroleum resources have been produced, and
predicts a decrease of production in future. In fact, around 40% of European energy
production comes from oil combustion (EIA 2006a).
The Price of Coal
The price of coal is based on the price of Australian thermal coal for export. The data on coal
prices was extracted from the IMF database. Arguably, coal is the dominant driver of CO2
pollution. Coal is the most abundant and the fastest growing fossil fuel and its large reserves
make it a popular candidate to meet the energy demand of the global community, short of
global warming concerns and other pollutants (Bradsher & Barboza 2006). According to the
International Energy Agency (EIA 2006a), proven reserves of coal are around 909 billion
tonnes, which could sustain the current production rate for 155 years, although at a 5%
growth per annum this would be reduced to 45 years, or until 2051. In Europe some 17% of
energy generation comes from burning coal.
Temperature
Temperature is the average of the Mean Temperature for four European capital cities
representing each country: France – Paris, Germany – Berlin, Italy – Rome, UK – London5.
Gross domestic product (GDP)
GDP is one the primary indicators used to measure the health and size of a country's
economy. It represents the total dollar value of all goods and services produced over a
specific time period. As stated by Enerdata (2010), in 2009, world energy consumption
decreased for the first time in 30 years and shrank by 1.1%, as a result of the financial and
economic crisis (GDP drop by 0.6% in 2009). While energy consumption in the OECD was
cut by 4.7% in 2009 and was thus almost down to its 2000 levels; in Europe energy
consumption shrank by 5% due to the slowdown in economic activity. One metric of
efficiency is energy intensity. This is a measure of the amount of energy it takes a country to
produce a dollar of gross domestic product (EIA 2006b). Figure 3 below shows the ratio
between energy usage and GDP for the selected countries, being France, Germany, Italy and
the UK and provides a comparison of overall European and world energy consumption.
The GDP figures for our data analysis have been extracted from the OECD quarterly
national accounts database and have been expressed as the growth rate compared to the
previous year, seasonally adjusted. However, due to the deficiency in monthly GDP data, it
should be noted that quarterly GDP figures tend to only be approximate estimates.

5

The data on temperature was extracted from the website www.wunderground.com.
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Figure 3
World Energy Intensity in 2006
(total primary energy consumption per dollar of GDP using PPP, Btu per (2000) US Dollars)

Source: Energy Information Administration (2006)

Global Financial Crisis and Europe
A dummy variable of 1 is used to designate the effects of the GFC, and zero indicating a
period without any such effects. Overall, the GFC is considered by many economists to be
the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s (Altman 2009; Bernanke
2009; Elstone 2008; Hilsentrath & Paletta 2008; Stewart 2008). Amongst some of the
consequences brought by the global financial crisis are the collapse of major businesses
including banks, weakening consumer confidence and declining wealth estimated in trillions
of U.S. dollars, large financial liabilities incurred by national governments, and a
considerable fall in economic activity (Brookings 2009).
One of the big risks here is the fact that the United States appears to be very
connected to the rest of the world (Baily & Elliott 2009). As stated by Ivry (2008), “credit
markets froze in August 2007 after two hedge funds run by New York-based Bear Stearns
Cos., the fifth-largest U.S. securities firm, collapsed due to the deteriorating value of its
mortgage-related holdings”. It was the inability to determine the price on such securities that
had frozen the market (Ivry 2008).
Thus, it appears that the GFC has been in effect in Europe since September 2007 until
the end of 2009. Also, an important implication here is that the term Global Financial Crisis
is regarded as an Australian term, among the most widely used term describing the events of
2007-2009 are the subprime crisis, global credit crisis, liquidity crisis etc.
Methodology
In order to achieve the research objectives, the present study includes two analytical
methodologies: first, empirical and statistical analyses of trends in prices of carbon permits
and major fossil fuels, as well as fluctuations in temperature and GDP over the period
January 2006–December 2009; and second, a survey of the theoretical and empirical
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literature, notably on the determinants of the price of carbon and the impact of such
interrelationships on emissions trading under the EU ETS.
Regression
Regression has been used as the main tool for conducting the data analysis. A multiple linear
regression has generally been relied on since this study involves one dependent variable –
price of carbon permits, and multiple independent variables – price of coal, oil, and natural
gas, as well as temperature and the level of GDP growth. The regression equation used is
depicted below. The regression analysis has been conducted with the help of Eviews6
software, using the ordinary least squares method (OLS), in which <10% level of significance
would indicate a significant result.
Ln PRICE OF CARBONt = α + β1 NATURAL GASt + β2 OILt + β3 COALt +
+ β4 TEMPERATUREt + β5GDPt + μt
Here t is year; whereas μ is a dummy variable which controls for the period-specific
effects of the global financial crisis (September 2007 –December 2009). The prices of
carbon, natural gas, oil and coal as well as temperature are all logged to the natural logarithm
(ln) so as to adjust for positive skew and to obtain a normal distribution (Bewick, Cheek &
Ball 2003). The growth rate of the real GDP was already expressed in percentage terms and
therefore there was no need to convert its values to the natural logarithm (ln). It should also
be noted that all the price estimates this paper are expressed in US dollars.
Correlation
The following discussion focuses on the calculation and interpretation of the sample product
moment correlation coefficient denoted by r. As Table 2 below reports, there is a 0.6328
correlation between natural gas and the carbon price, indicating a moderate positive linear
relationship between the two variables. The notion of this relationship will be further
discussed in the regression analysis. Interestingly, the correlation between coal and oil is
0.7147. This case is an illustration of a fairly positive linear relationship. Stemming from this
correlation outcome, it appears that oil and coal should not be incorporated into the same
regression equation so as not to distort the results and the underlying data analysis.
Table 2
Correlation Output (based on monthly figures)

Carbon Price (ln)
Natural Gas (ln)
Oil (ln)
Coal (ln)
Temperature (ln)
GDP growth rate

Carbon Price Natural Gas
(ln)
(ln)
1
0.6328
1
0.1228
0.1472
0.2532
0.3568
-0.2180
-0.4770
-0.2065
-0.42956

Oil (ln)

1
0.7147
0.3731
0.1117
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Coal (ln)

1
0.1297
-0.5458

Temperature GDP growth
(ln)
rate

1
0.1820
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CORRELATION BETWEEN NATURAL GAS AND CARBON PRICE
According to Roques et al. (2006), there is a high correlation between gas and carbon prices.
The authors also note that the winter of 2005/6 saw threats of gas supply disruptions in
Europe and very high gas prices, and they point to the uncertainty over the evolution of gas
and carbon prices in the future (Roques et al. 2006). In conducting their study, Roques et al.
(2006) drew random trajectories for gas and carbon prices for a series of Monte Carlo
simulations and the long-term gas and carbon price trajectories followed similar patterns.
Another interesting point brought out by the authors is the fact that most new power plants
built in liberalised European electricity markets since the 1990s have been gas-fired power
stations (Roques et al., 2006). So from the correlation analysis alone it can be sees that the
price of natural gas and the carbon price are interrelated. Concluding, it can be seesn that
there is a linear relationship between the price of natural gas and the carbon price.
CORRELATION BETWEEN COAL AND OIL
Simple logic along with the laws of economics dictates that as the price of oil goes up, there
will be more demand for alternative sources, thus creating shortages of those alternatives and
pushing their price upward. As a result, the price of coal would go up and a report by ANZ
also points to a very strong correlation between thermal coal and oil prices (ANZ
Commodities 2010).
AUTOCORRELATION OR SERIAL CORRELATION
During some of the regression analyses the problem of autocorrelation was encountered, as
detected by the Durbin-Watson d statistic. The technique for handling autocorrelation
problems that was used in the data analysis was the Newey-West approach. Importantly,
when using a Newey-West approach, one may disregard the meaning of the Durbin-Watson
statistic and proceed to interpret the regression output.
In total, four regression models (A, B, C, D) were run, the quick summary of which is
provided in Appendix 2, each adjusted using a Newey-West technique, and each necessarily
containing the price of natural gas and the dummy variable.
Discussion and Conclusion
“Energy is central to our lives. We rely on it for transport, for heating and cooling our homes,
and running our factories” (EUROPA [the official European Union website] 2010a).
Theoretically, the price of fossil fuels is most likely to have a direct impact on carbon price,
as evident from the studies by Point Carbon and the Chicago Climate Exchange (2004), the
European Climate Exchange (2004), Redmond and Convery (2006) and Retamal (2009).
This notion is further amplified by the fact that a substantial amount of the EU gross
electricity generation (57%) was produced by the four countries considered in our study –
Germany (19%), France (17%), the UK (12%) and Italy (9%), as stated by Eurostat (2010).
Most EU electricity generated from non-renewable sources comes from natural gas (23%),
thus making it the most important non-renewable source of energy in Europe (Eurostat 2010).
In addition, most new power plants built in European electricity markets since the 1990s have
been gas-fired power stations (Roques et al. 2006), presumably because natural gas is the
least polluting fossil fuel. This has substantially increased the EU reliance on natural gas in
energy production. The regression analysis has provided evidence that the price of natural gas
is very closely correlated with the price of carbon. Indeed, the price of natural gas has proven
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to be the largest driver of the price of carbon out of all the independent variables studied.
The price of natural gas appears significant in all four regression models, at a 99%confidence-level. This is consistent with the findings of Retamal (2009) that also recognised
that the price of natural gas had an influence on the price of permits under the EU ETS.
When examining electricity production by source, it is evident that in 2008 only very
little of the EU electricity was produced from petroleum products, essentially oil (3%)
(Eurostat 2010). This is why the price of oil appears not to be a considerable driver of the
price of carbon, being significant in only one regression model (C), at a 95%-confidencelevel. However, Redmond and Convery (2006), who examined the effect of changes in the
price of oil and gas, found that increases in the price of oil appeared to have the greatest
impact on the price of permits. This is inconsistent with the findings of this study, where the
price of natural gas was the driving force of changes in the price of carbon.
As mentioned earlier in the paper, coal is the major driver of CO2 pollution, so it
could be expected that the price of EU ETS permits would be affected by the price of coal.
However, it only appears significant in one regression model (B), at a 90%-confidence-level.
In fact, according to the Encyclopedia of Earth (2010), over the past decade, there has been a
significant decline in the use of coal and natural gas has been the fastest growing fuel source
in the EU. Arguably, environmental concerns are a major reason for the decline in the use of
coal, most evident in the EU’s Directive 2001/80/EC, which seeks to limit air pollutants
produced from large coal-fired combustion plants (Encyclopedia of Earth, 2010). The EU
ETS explicitly limits the amount of CO2 that power generators can emit, thus further
decreasing the probability of expanded coal use in EU member countries.
Notably, temperature is significant at a 90%-confidence-level in two (A and C) of the
four regression models devised. This does not give the authors enough confidence to suggest
that weather is a significant driver of the carbon price which should be related to earlier
findings in the literature. After studying various carbon price determinants under the EU
ETS, Kruger (2008), Point Carbon and the Chicago Climate Exchange (2004), the European
Climate Exchange (2004), Retamal (2009), Betz (2006) – all found that weather had a
significant impact on the level of emissions by the major covered installations in the power
and heat sector. The legitimacy of this relationship seems rather obvious, given the impact
temperature tends to have on the demand for and supply of electricity - the more it deviates
from the average, the greater the likelihood that consumers turn to using heating or cooling
devices. Finally, Valor, Meneu & Caselles (2001) have indicated that weather also had a
considerable effect on various segments of the economy. In fact, a lot of economic activities
are influenced by changes in weather and business revenues may be seriously affected by a
deviation from typical weather conditions (Valor et al. 2001).
Interestingly, the level of GDP shows as statistically significant in all four regression
models, although at varying levels of significance, ranging from 90% to 99%. This research
finding corresponds with the view expressed by Point Carbon and Chicago Climate Exchange
(2004) as well as the European Climate Exchange (2004), which suggested that the price of
carbon will depend on a number of factors, including economic growth. Practically, such
dependence of the price of permits on the level of economic activity can be explained by the
fact that the more prosperous the economy, the greater the output of production, the greater
the level of emissions.
Finally, the effects of the global financial crisis have had statistical significance (90%
and 95%) in two (B and C) of the four regression models we have examined. Considering the
dampening impact of the GFC on EU levels of production, it is no surprise that this variable
has played such a considerable role in shaping the price of carbon under the EU ETS.
To summarise, all of the independent variables considered in this paper have had an
impact on the price of carbon, although each to a different extent. It appears that the price of
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natural gas, oil and coal, as well as changes in the level of GDP, fluctuations in weather and
the onset of the global financial crisis together explain about half of the changes in the price
of carbon. This is likely to become more significant for the valuation of derivatives in the
future as the market matures.
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Appendices
Appendix 1 – Regression Output Summary
Regression A: carbon price & natural gas + oil + coal + temperature + GDP + GFC
[dummy]. It is quite interesting to report this regression, as it includes all the hypothesised
variables, with the number of explanatory variables excluding the constant term [being
carbon price] k’ = 6. This regression analysis reveals that the only factors that influence the
price of carbon are natural gas*** (0.0000), temperature* (0.0749), and GDP** (0.0123).
This regression also suggests that such variables as oil (0.4840) and coal (0.7713) are not the
primary determinants of the price of carbon. Interestingly, the GFC [dummy] (0.1108) also
seems to be an important determinant of the price of carbon; however, given the 0.05 level of
significance, it cannot be considered as statistically significant.
Regression B: carbon price & natural gas + coal + temperature + GDP + GFC [dummy].
With the number of explanatory variables excluding the constant term [being carbon price] k’
= 5, this regression equation demonstrates that changes in the price of natural gas***
(0.0000) and coal* (0.0730), as well as fluctuations in GDP* (0.0707) and the occurrence of
the GFC* [dummy] (0.0964) have a considerable effect on changes in the price of carbon.
Interestingly, temperature (0.1151) also seems to be an important determinant of the price of
carbon; however, given the 0.05 level of significance, it cannot be considered as statistically
significant.
Regression C: carbon price & gas + oil + temperature + GDP + GFC [dummy]. With the
number of explanatory variables excluding the constant term [being carbon price] k’ = 5, this
regression equation demonstrates that natural gas*** (0.0000), oil** (0.0107), temperature*
(0.0662), GDP*** (0.0038) and the GFC** [dummy] (0.0298) – all have a significant impact
on the price of carbon.
Regression D: carbon price & natural gas + oil + GDP + GFC [dummy]. With the number
of explanatory variables excluding the constant term [being carbon price] k’ = 4, this
regression shows that the price of carbon is affected by changes in the price of natural gas***
(0.0002) and GDP** (0.0322). Stemming from the results obtained from running this
regression model, the price of oil and the GFC [dummy] have no impact on the price of
carbon.
Regression A

Regression B

Regression C

Regression D

Gas

0.0000***

0.0000***

0.0000***

0.0002***

Oil

0.4840

//////

0.0107**

0.1379

Coal

0.7713

0.0730*

//////

//////

Temperature

0.0749*

0.1151

0.0662*

//////

GDP

0.0123**

0.0707*

0.0038***

0.0322**

GFC

0.1108

0.0964*

0.0298**

0.1200

R-squared

0.5081

0.5006

0.5064

0.4723

Notes:
***
**
*
//////

0.01
0.05
0.10
variable not included in the regression model being considered
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Appendix 2 – Relationship between Carbon price and Its Hypothesised Drivers
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